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This article examines the converging focus on “governance” by those donors
and scholars who promote investment in land in Africa as well as by scholars
and activists who criticize what they call “land grabs.” This focus on
governance is particularly found in terms of understanding and assessing
socio-economic consequences among the communities for the land deals,
investment initiatives which have been accelerating on the continent over the
last decade and longer. This article expands the concept of governance by
examining how structures of authority and power are also involved in defining
who belongs, or who has claims to belong, to these territories. It explores the
topic of land deals and community rights through the conceptual lens of
governance and belonging, the ability to be recognized as part of the
community at various levels of action (including in terms of national
citizenship). It starts with an examination of the recent increase in land
investments in Africa, setting out its broad parameters, including public
criticisms raised and some of the protests around them, and noting some of
the key issues on which scholars have focused. In the next two sections, the
article analyses these processes through the conceptual lens of governance
and belonging as a way to bring out what the article proposes are key issues
for assessing matters on community rights in regards to investments concerning
natural resources in Africa, particularly over land. This analysis raises
questions about those who uncritically promote Free and Prior Informed
Consent as the solution to ensure “communities” approve any land deals.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
This article will examine current scholarly and policy discussion and debate
concerning investment in land in Africa and how governance is seen as a
key means for ensuring increased economic value and/or greater benefits
for the affected community and nation at large resulting from such economic
activity. The focus in particular is on how community itself is seen as both
an entity which needs to be involved in any new proposed land governance
initiative as well as a presumed key beneficiary of future land investments
in Africa. The article proceeds, with a brief anecdote from previous field
research in Zimbabwe to illustrate some of the challenges one needs to
address when thinking of how to implement such community rights in
terms of land governance mechanisms. The brief anecdote concerns a
proposed tourism investment in a Zimbabwean Communal Land (the
postcolonial name for the former colonial “native reserves” in which the
majority of Zimbabwean smallholder farmers live and farm) adjacent to a
national park in the early 1990s.
The negotiations between the Hurungwe District Council,1 the then
local governmental authority, and the investor based in Harare yielded
an economic plan concerning a commercial intervention in the African
smallholders’ land area, which seemed a win-win situation. On the
one hand, they had agreed for a Harare-based tourist company to offer
exclusive low-impact visits of both wildlife and traditional African
villages for high-paying international tourists. In turn, the villagers in
the Chundu area living on the edge of Mana Pools National Park in the
north-northwest corner of Zimbabwe would receive a proportion of
the fees paid by the company through the administrative architecture
of CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources),2 the then highly-regarded and widely touted
1 Since the mid-1990s the rural local authorities in Zimbabwe are called Rural
District Councils.
2 CAMPFIRE is a Zimbabwean governmental programme which began in 1989
with support from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), a Zimbabwe non-
governmental organization (Zimbabwe Trust), and the University of Zimbabwe’s
Centre for Applied Social Sciences. As its website notes, “The programme is
principally designed to promote the sustainable utilization of natural resources
and preserving the rich natural heritage of Zimbabwe, through the generation
of income for rural communities. CAMPFIRE operates with the support of the
Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, as part of its conservation
function in rural areas, in which 58 out of 60 Rural District Councils (RDCs) in
Zimbabwe participate.” Campfire Association Zimbabwe, “About Campfire
Association & FAQs” (n.d.) <campfirezimbabwe.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=53> accessed 20 January 2016.
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community-based conservation programme.
As it was explained to me by the then Hurungwe District CAMPFIRE
coordinator in 1993, it seemed CAMPFIRE was a perfect vehicle for
ensuring that community benefits would emerge from the then quite
profitable tourist industry in Zimbabwe as it would allow the
community to receive money for development initiatives as a form of
compensation for the costs of living with wildlife (such as destroyed
crops, occasional attacks on their domestic animals, etc.) and as an
incentive so they would see economic value to wildlife and seek to
conserve, not kill or poach, the wild animals. It was an investment
that would fit the criteria of socially responsible investment.
Yet, a few years later the low-impact tourism business never came
to fruition, regardless of it being seen as a type of socially responsible
investment. Rather, the CAMPFIRE programme in this part of Hurungwe
District was a heated site of struggle between the Rural District Council
(the local government authority) and traditional authorities,
smallholder farmers and some of their political representatives over
the issue of access to land in this section of the communal land. The
dispute was not only over questions about who decided which land
was to be taken away from farmers to be given to wildlife but, more
importantly, who decided who could gain access to the land as resident
householders. In other words, the investment foundered because of a
dispute of who defined the relevant community.
An important background to this initiative was that the Rural
District Council officials had declared that they had legislative powers
to decide who could be a resident in the Communal Lands, which is
officially vested in the President and gives the local government bodies
authority over them. In practice, however, access to land is largely
governed by what is called communal tenure. The term can lead to
assumptions that land access follows pre-colonial traditions but, as
many have shown, access to land in Zimbabwe has been strongly shaped
by colonial and postcolonial realities.3 In practice, communal tenure
largely refers to usufruct rights for families who either have long ties to
the chiefs or headman or other designated traditional authorities or
who have received a piece of land from such a leader in a particular
3 Angela Cheater, “The Ideology of Communal Land Tenure in Zimbabwe:
Mythogenesis Enacted?” (1990) 60, Africa,188-206; see also Donald S. Moore,
Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe (Duke University
Press, 2005).
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4 Eric Matingo, “Projects Spark Land Use War,” Horizon (Harare, Zimbabwe, July
1994), 22 <www.postcolonialweb.org/zimbabwe/politics/wildlife.html>
accessed 10 October 2014.
5 See Blair Rutherford, “Conditional Belonging: Farm Workers and the Cultural
Politics of Recognition in Zimbabwe” (2008), 39, Development and Change,
73-99. Fifteen years later, in 2009 there appears to be another dispute over
who had the authority over granting access to land in this same area, though
this time between the acting Chief Chundu and many of the villagers. The
dispute was over the reported plan of acting Chief Chundu to turn over a
proportion of the smallholders’ land for a joint venture with a Chinese company
in a wildlife safari project.  In the newspaper report, at least, the Rural District
Council is taking the side of the smallholders.This same acting Chief was also
threatening to remove “foreigners” who he said received land from some of the
headmen illegally, without registering through the local government; thus taking
the perspective being put forth by the local government authority in the 1990s.
Here the traditional authorities – the (acting) Chief and his headmen – were
divided. See Zimbabwe Online Press,” Villages to give way to game park”
(Zimbabwe Online Press, 13 August 2009) <www.zimbabweonlinepress.com/
top_news/994-villagers-to-give-way-to-game-park.html> accessed12 October
2014; NewsdzeZimbabwe,” Hurungwe Chief drives out “foreigners’”
(NewsdzeZimbabwe, 13 August 2012) <www.newsdzezimbabwe.co. uk/2012/
08/hurungwe-chief-drives-out-foreigners.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
Communal Land. There can be tension between these land-giving
authorities and the Rural District Council who by law have the ultimate
say over the distribution of land in the Communal Lands.
The local government officials saw Chundu as full of squatters,
people who were not authorized to live and farm there. These officials
saw CAMPFIRE as another tool to evict these squatters and to ensure
that they did not receive any monetary benefits. In turn, traditional
authorities assumed they had the right to allocate land to newcomers,
regardless of what the government legislation and policies declared,
and they resented this infringement of their authority.4 Many such
newcomers in this part of the Communal Lands were former
mineworkers or farm workers who came from neighbouring countries
during the colonial period, or their descendants. Despite their longevity
or even being born in the country to foreign parents, they are defined
through citizenship laws and often in everyday practices as “aliens,”
and thus they often have difficulty making claims to land or resources
unless they are able to find a traditional authority willing, often for a
fee, to grant them access.5
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6 See Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, “Wildlife and Politics: CAMPFIRE
in Zimbabwe” (2000) 31, Development and Change, 605-627; Vupenyu Dzingirai,
“‘CAMPFIRE is not for Ndebele Migrants’: The impact of excluding outsiders
from CAMPFIRE in the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe” (2003) 29, Journal of Southern
African Studies, 445-459; James Murombedzi, “Devolution and stewardship in
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme” (1999) 11, International Development, 287-
293.
7 See, for example, Hany Besada, Doing Business in Fragile States: The private
sector, natural resources and conflict in Africa (2013) (Background research
Paper submitted to the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda,
May) (on file with author); Lorenzo Cotula, The Great African Land Grab?
Agricultural Investments and the Global Food System (Zed Books, 2013).
This brief example is not unique, as the academic literature
concerning the implementation of CAMPFIRE critically shows how what
sounded like a progressive community-based and profitable
conservational initiative often ran aground on issues of who had the
decision-making power over territory and who belonged there.6 This is
a real life occurrence on how governance over natural resources such
as land in Africa inherently raises questions not only about community
rights but also about the definition of the community itself. The
unproblematic community discussed with me by the Hurungwe District
CAMPFIRE coordinator (and often by the promoters of CAMPFIRE and
other such community-based conservation efforts) did not address the
dispute between the chief and the local government authority over
who was able to constitute the “community” itself.
Many commentators and analysts have recognized questions about
governance as being a key factor in understanding and assessing socio-
economic consequences among the communities for the land deals,
investment initiatives which have been accelerating on the continent
over the last decade and longer.7 However, there is less attention to
how these structures of authority and power are also involved in defining
who belongs, or who has claims to belong, to these territories. As
much as governance, questions of belonging also have significant
impacts on land investments and the calculations of their costs and
benefits.
This article explores the topic of land deals and community rights
through the conceptual lens of governance and belonging, the ability
to be recognized as part of the community at various levels of action
(including in terms of national citizenship).  I will start by briefly talking
about this recent increase in land investments in Africa, setting out its
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broad parameters, including public criticisms raised and some of the
protests around them, and noting some of the key issues on which
scholars have focused. In the next two sections, I will provide a more
thorough examination of governance and belonging as a way to bring
out what I argue are key issues for assessing matters on community
rights in regard to investments concerning natural resources in Africa,
particularly over land, which should be taken into account to help
ensure there is less conflict and perhaps broader and positive
development consequences for those who live there. Such issues, I
will suggest, are potentially relevant for future policies concerning
governance initiatives over land and natural resources more broadly in
Africa.
2.  LAND INVESTMENT VERSUS LAND GRABS
Since 2000, Africa has increasingly been a region of interest for land
investment by companies, investment funds, governments, and national
elites due to a confluence of wider economic pressures, policy openings,
environmental changes, and political conditions. Let me give two brief
examples of these dynamics. One important pressure is the growing
anxieties over food security connected to rising food prices associated
in part with environmental changes resulting from climate change and
rising urban populations, which has made agricultural projects an
attractive investment for many investors. For instance, the population
of Gulf states is expected to double between 2000 and 2030, while
their cereal production is projected to decline due to environmental
changes, which has led many of their state agencies to invest in food
production abroad.8 Another example is the 2009 European Union
(EU) legislation, which requires 20 per cent of all energy used in the
EU and 10 per cent of each member’s state transport fuel must come
from renewable sources by 2020. This has led to significant European
investment into biofuel projects in Africa and elsewhere.9 Yet, at the
8 Shepard Daniel “Land Grabbing and Potential Implications for World Food
Security”in M. Behnassi, S. Shahid, and J. D. ’Silva (eds), Sustainable Agricultural
Development (Springer, 2011).
9 Tinyade Kachika, T. Land Grabbing in Africa: A Review of the Impacts and Possible
Policy Responses (Oxfam International, 2010) 18 <www.oxfamblogs.org/
eastafrica/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Land-Grabbing-in-Africa.-Final.pdf>
accessed 20 January 2016.
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10 Cotula, 52-56 (n 7).
11 See Laura German, George Schoneveld and Esther Mwangi, “Contemporary
Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Legal
Deficiency or Elite Capture of the Rule of Law?” (2013) 48, World Development,
1-18; Martina Locher and Emmanuel Sulle,” Challenges and methodological
flaws in reporting the global land rush: Observations from Tanzania” (2014)
41, Journal of Peasant Studies, 569-592.
12. Klaus Deiningerand Derek ByerleeRising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it
yield sustainable and equitable benefits? (World Bank, 2011), xxxii.
13 ibid xiv.
14 Available at <landmatrix.org> accessed August 2016.
same time, nationals acquired much of the overall land accumulation,
driven by dynamics of capital accumulation and social differentiation.10
The exact amount of land transferred is disputed, depending on
the methodologies used and due to often poor, public recordkeeping
concerning the transfer of land in many African countries. The estimates
range from 21 million to 56 or more million hectares of land acquired
for investment purposes in sub-Saharan Africa during this period.11 For
example, a World Bank study found that between 2004 and 2008, the
amount of land transferred to investors in some African countries was
very high: 4 million ha in Sudan, 2.7 million ha in Mozambique and
1.2 million ha in Ethiopia. The majority of the investors, the study
observed, were nationals.12
Despite the methodological differences and disputes in interpreta-
tions, all commentators agree that Africa has been the site of growing
interest in land acquisition, be it for agricultural projects for food crops
or biofuels, forestry, carbon credits, or speculation, particularly after
the 2008 financial crisis. For instance, Deininger and Byerlee13 note
that whereas before 2008 an annual expansion of new agricultural
lands on the global scale averaged about 4 million hectares, 56 million
hectares of large-scale farmland deals were announced in 2009, over
70 per cent of which were in Africa. The investors tend to be a mix of
companies and individuals from the particular African country, those
from the country’s diaspora population, other African countries
(particularly South Africa), Europe, North America, Middle Eastern and
Asian companies or government investors. For example, when I
examined the records of approximately half of the land deals in Africa
since 2000 listed on the Land Matrix in October 2014,14 in ascending
order of geographical location, more secondary investors came from
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15 See also Cotula (n 7).
16 FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization), “From Land grab to Win-Win: Seizing
the Opportunities of International Investments in Agriculture” (Economic and
Social Perspectives Policy Brief 4, June 2009).
Europe, then Asia, Africa, North America, the Middle East, and finally
South America and Australia.15
The characterization and analyses of these land investment deals
tend to split into two contrasting narratives of those who promote
and celebrate them compared to those who decry, if not, condemn
them. These two narratives dominate the media coverage of land
investments in Africa and much of the scholarship. The promoters of
these investments tend not only to forecast profits but they also predict
positive consequences for the local community and the nation at large.
Such reported and promoted benefits could include more jobs, increased
demand for various services and products by local producers, higher
tax revenues, and more profitable use of the land. A 2009 Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) policy brief provides such a sanguine
view. It says:
The sale of farmland to international investors is not without risks
for developing countries …. They also promise several
opportunities, including a technology transfer to stimulate
innovation and productivity increases; quality improvements;
employment creation; backward and forward linkages and
multiplier effects through local sourcing of labour and other inputs.
Even an increase in food supplies for the domestic market and for
export is possible. However, these benefits will not come
automatically, and it will take efforts of both investors and
recipients of investments to realize the full potential of land deals.
Above all, it requires an understanding that collaboration promises
mutual benefits.16
In contrast, motivated in part by widely mass-mediated reported
stories about proverbial sweetheart deals on land investment, where
investors were given preferential and undervalued access to land
compared to local peoples, and a historically grounded scepticism of
outside investors promising betterment for (rural) Africans, there has
been a strong critique of these land investments, characterizing them
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17 One of the most prominent cases involved a South Korean investment in
Madagascar. The 2008 Financial Times report of the South Korean conglomerate
Daewoo’s 99 year lease of 1.2 million hectares in Madagascar to grow maize
and palm oil, largely for the South Korean market, with the company’s
expectation they would not pay anything for the land, is widely recognized as
helping to set off the a wave of stories of the “African land-grab.”  S. Jung-a,  C.
Oliver and T. Burgis, “Daewoo to cultivate Madagascar land for free” Financial
Times (London, 20 November, 2008) <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e894c6a-b65c-
11dd-89dd-0000779fd18c.html#axzz3HdUoAk00> accessed 29 October
2014. See also Barry Ness, Sara Brogaard, Stefan Anderberg, and Lennart
Olsson,” The African Land-Grab: Creating Equitable Governance Strategies
through Codes-of-Conduct and Certification Schemes” (2009) Conference on
the Human Dimension of Global Environmental change. Amsterdam, 2-4
December <www.earthsystemgovernance.org/ac2009/papers/AC2009-
0294.pdf> accessed 5 November 2014.
18 Oakland Institute. “Special Investigation Phase One: Understanding Land
Investment Deals in Africa” (Oakland Institute, n.d.) <media.oaklandinstitute.
org/special-investigation-understanding-land-investment-deals-africa>
accessed 14 October 2014.
19 Cotula, 141, 143 (n 7).
as an African land grab.17 From reporters to activists to academics in
and outside of Africa, there have been numerous concerns raised about
these so-named land grabs, including the displacement of existing
populations and removing land-based resources from their use, which
undermine food security and other local livelihoods and cause other
detrimental environmental, social and political consequences. This
perspective criticizes the investors and the African governments, who
facilitate such investments, for not putting the interests of the local
rural African farmers, pastoralists, and fishers first. As laid out by The
Oakland Institute in a series of investigative reports, “large scale
investments in land in Africa are resulting in food insecurity, the
displacement of small farmers, conflict, environmental devastation,
water loss, and the further impoverishment and political instability of
African nations.”18
For instance, in Tanzania and Ghana after land was taken for jatropha
plantations by foreign investors and the actual investments fizzled
out, there were reports about how those local populations made
landless by the plantations or had their landscapes transformed by the
investment were in much poorer economic shape than before the
investment.19 Also, as noted in Footnote 17, a controversial land
investment by Daewoo in Madagascar became a reason for greater
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20 Mathias Mundi, “Why Ethiopia is making a historic “master plan” U-turn” (BBC
Monitoring, 18 January 2016) <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35325536>
accessed 20 January, 2016.
21 Human Rights Watch, “Waiting Here for Death”: Forced Displacement and
“Villagization” in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
22 Such standards have become common goals promoted by many international
agencies, including international financial institutions.  For instance, in 2006
the International Financial Corporation and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency of the World Bank Group revised the performance standards
required by those companies receiving loans to focus on social, environmental
and labour standards and broader community impacts.  The aim is to “minimize
commercial and reputational risks caused by loopholes in legislation or
enforcement capacity in countries where investments are implemented.”
Deininger and Byerlee, 136 (n12).
23 FAO, 2 (n 16).
protests. Recent protests in Ethiopia, in which the state cracked down
on and killed more than 100 people, were also tied up with the
government’s plan to expand the capital of Addis Ababa. Many people
in the surrounding communities and others saw this plan as a way for
the state to grab land from them,20 an action that the Ethiopian
government has done elsewhere, displacing tens of thousands if not
more.21
Although the narratives promoting land investment in Africa and
those that criticize them as land grabs are polar extremes in terms of
assessing consequences of this growing trend, they tend to converge
when suggesting how they can be improved. The convergence centres
on governance. The promoters of land investments and the detractors
argue that better governance can ensure the distribution of development
benefits or ensure that those affected by the land deals have a voice in
terms of agreeing to them and in negotiating particular benefits for
themselves.
An example is the FAO document cited earlier. It lists issues which
investors and policy-makers should examine to ensure that the
collaboration between investors and recipients of investment lead to
mutual benefits such as better systems to recognize local land rights,
imposition of labour, social and environmental standards,22 stakeholder
involvement and codes of conduct and other more inclusive strategies.23
In turn, the critics of land grabs point to the lack of accountable
governments in Africa which enable these deals to take place; deals
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24 Oakland Institute, “Understanding land investment deals in Africa” (Oakland
Institute, December 2011) <www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oakland
institute.org/files/OI_brief_land_grabs_leave_africa_thirsty_1.pdf> accessed
22 October 2014.
25 Saturnino Borras Jr. and Jennifer Franco, “Contemporary Discourses and
Contestation around Pro-Poor Land Policies and Land Governance” (2010) 10
Journal of Agrarian Change, 2.
26 German, Schoneveld and Mwangi, 3 (n 11).
27 FAO, Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land,
Fisheries and forests in the Context of National Food Security (FAO, 2012). See
also African Union, Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development
Bank Consortium, Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa. Addis
Ababa: AUC-ECA-AfDB Consortium (African Union, 2010).
which turn out to be largely detrimental to African smallholder farmers,
pastoralists and fishers.24
Governance has thus become the lodestone for policy analyses and
scholarly attention to land investments in Africa: it carries the burden
to try to improve the existing situation to ensure that future land deals
are less contentious and can lead to equitable economic growth. Land
governance has become a dominant area of mainstream policy concern
in terms of finding efficient and effective ways of administrating land
issues through, for example land titles, cadastres, decentralization and
so forth.25 Observably, with regards to the topic of large-scale land
investments, the term has also taken on more democratizing agendas
of providing additional public information about the deals and better
consultation mechanisms and decision-making processes which, it is
argued, ensure those local communities who are affected by the transfer
of access to land have a voice and a say in the deals.
3.  LAND GOVERNANCE: PINNING DOWN
THE COMMUNITY
There are a series of global, regional and national land governance
initiatives seeking to guide or regulate investments in agriculture.26
A key element in these initiatives is the importance of some form of
community involvement in the proposed governance schemes. The
FAO’s “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure
of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food
Security”27 provide guidance to governments for the development of
national level policies and programmes to try to ensure that more
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28 Philip Seufert, “The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests” (2013) 10, Globalizations, 181-186.
29 FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development and the World Bank “Principles for
Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and
Resources. A discussion note” (25 January 2010) <siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTARD/214574-1111138388661/22453321/Principles_ Extended.
pdf> accessed 14 October, 2014.
30 Olivier De Schutter, “Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: A set of core
principles and measures to address the human rights challenge” (11 June
2009)<www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/BriefingNoteland
grab.pdf> accessed 16 October, 2014. See also United Nations Human Rights
(Office of the Commissioner), “Vulnerable land users must be protected by
international guidelines – UN expert urges Rome summit” (UNHR Press Release,
3 October 2011) <www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/press_releases/
20111003_pr_vg.pdf> accessed 22 October 2014.
31 Liz Alden Wily, “The Law is to Blame: The Vulnerable Status of common Property
Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2011) 42, Development and Change, 733-757;
Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, Paul Mathieu and Camilla Toulmin”,
Agricultural investment and international land deals: Evidence from a multi-
country study in Africa” (2011) 3, Food Security 3, S99-S113.
sustainable and transparent land governance systems emerge, including
the role of indigenous land institutions (also known as customary
tenure institutions). There is no scholarly evidence of which I am aware
that shows how it has been implemented. Nonetheless, there are high
hopes that the guidelines will make state governance regimes over
natural resources more responsive to communities, particularly since
many of the voluntary guidelines explicitly refer to existing human
rights obligations in regards to natural resources.28
Other initiatives focus specifically on advocating for better
governance of land investment. For example, the FAO, International
Fund for Agricultural Development, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development and the World Bank set out the “Principles for
Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods
and Resources”.29 In turn, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food provides guidelines to investors and host countries on securing
human rights in the context of large-scale land acquisitions and leases.30
Almost all commentators agree that the governments of specific
African countries are the key agency to be reformed.31 In particular,
analysts argue that African governments need to implement better land
governance, which can guarantee transparency, inclusive decision-
making, and take into account community rights. For example, as some
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32 Cotula, Vermeulen, Mathieu and Toulmin, S104 (n 31).
33 Alden Wily, 735 (n 31).
34 Kachika, 8-9 (n 9).
35 See Donald S. Moore, “The Crucible of Cultural Politics: Reworking
“Development” in Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands (1999) 26, American
Ethnologist, 654-689.
authors put it, “The central role of host governments in allocating land
raises a number of issues, particularly with regard to the extent to
which these governments take account of local interests in land, water
and other natural resources.”32 Local interests speak to the issue of
community rights and how to ensure they are taken into consideration
in the land governance systems, particularly when land is alienated for
sale or lease to foreign and national investors.
To better understand the issue of community rights and land
governance, a number of studies have focused on the problematic
relationship between national laws and institutions and what can be
called customary land tenure. In an important and widely recognized
contribution, Liz Alden Wily33 proposes that over half the land base in
sub-Saharan Africa is governed by customary norms, involving around
half a billion landholders.
After independence, as she points out, many postcolonial African
states continued colonial-era policies and laws which vested the
ownership of untitled lands or lands held under customary regimes in
the state. This means that even though land allocation, use, and
adjudication may be done largely through the rules, practices and
institutions which could be called customary tenure, legally the state
or some state body actually owns the land, as is the case in Zimbabwe
as the introductory example shows.
Most of the lands targeted in this land rush can be found in common
property regimes; hence they are regarded as public lands. A great deal
of these lands is legally owned by the state and many government
authorities see foreign investment as a way to expand the economy
and modernize what they deem to be unproductive utilization of the
land.34 Continuing the colonial discourse which devalued African
agricultural practices,35 government officials argue that foreign investors
will improve agricultural production and the national economy
compared to existing land uses; an argument which has helped the
dispossession of many Africans, not necessarily with compensation, in
order to transfer the land to the land investors.
248 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
36 Alden Wily (n 31).
37 Alden Wily, 740 (n 31).
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39 Ibid.
Even though rights-based initiatives and pressures over the last
twenty years have influenced greater attempts to democratize
legislation concerning land administration, the empirical record
suggests these actions have been limited in practice, if not in design.
Alden Wily36 herself critically reviews the different land laws in a number
of sub-Saharan African countries and shows their limitations in terms
of recognizing any sort of community rights in regards to dispossession.
The key criterion she deploys in pointing out the weaknesses of
legislation is the lack of democratic institutions to enable land users to
participate in the negotiations with investors, and the ability to give
or withhold consent.
Alden Wily shows that the laws in the majority of African countries
define such land as state or public land to be disposed of at the discretion
of the government with no consultation of the local landholders: “While
other, largely governance enablers pave the way to dispossession, the
most efficacious is the law; that is, the terms by which legislation in so
many [sub-Saharan African] economies renders unregistered, untitled
lands and/or lands acquired and held under indigenous or customary
regimes, the property of the state.”37 Accordingly, through this evaluative
lens she clearly finds these laws to be discriminatory. But even those
countries which acknowledge communal rights are found wanting under
her examination.
While she argues that her critical assessment shows the need to
institute more rights-based changes to legislation and policies (an
argument clearly laid out in the title of her article, “The law is to blame”),
others suggest that even if such changes were to occur they may not be
sufficient to change the power imbalance. For example, Laura German,
George Schoneveld, and Esther Mwangi38 carefully review the legislation
and policies concerning land tenure and acquisition, investment
promotion and environmental protection as well as stakeholder
experiences with land acquisition in Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania
and Zambia. They found that despite great variation in legal frameworks
governing large-scale land acquisition in the four countries, there was
the same result: a loss of customary rights to vast areas of land.
German, Schoneveld, and Mwangi39 also underscored weaknesses
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in legislation, policies and institutional arrangements governing
customary land rights and their transfer to others. Contrary to Alden
Wiley’s the-law-is-to-blame argument, the former suggests that the law
is not the only source of problems. Rather, they stress the role of human
agency in influencing outcomes that are detrimental to local
communities. To bolster their argument, they present examples such
as motivations of personal enrichment of chiefs; the strong faith in the
modernization narrative and large-scale government investment which
makes them discriminate against what they perceive as traditional and
backward communal land uses; the widespread incentive for officials
in local government and line ministries to generate revenue, which
make them predisposed to look for ways to generate rents rather than,
say, turn down land investment opportunities; differential awareness
and expectations amongst community members vis-à-vis their land
rights and what they would receive from land investment; and the
difficulty of customary land users to question the authority of local
and customary leaders, whether due to custom, intimidation, coercion
by outsider actors, or legal illiteracy.40
Recognizing such power relations, forms of accumulation, and
potential for elite capture arguably motivated Klaus Deininger, the lead
economist for the World Bank’s Development Research Group, to
propose ambitious interventions which would use participatory tools
to enable land registration that “reflect local perceptions of existing
rights” and to establish local bodies which are accountable and
representative to administer them. His initiative would allow for:
community management of basic land administration processes
(such as allocation of individual rights, updating of registries,
and other internal affairs, according to given bylaws); boundaries
are recorded and a clear internal governance structure (with
internal control structures) is established to allow interaction with
outsiders; records are integrated with those used in the regular
land administration system to prevent double-allocation of land,
to allow land users enter into joint ventures with investors, or to
allow groups to gradually individualize land rights if desired;
and relevant secondary rights, including use rights to land and
associated natural resources, such as those held by pastoralists,
migrants, and forest dwellers, are recorded and protected, rather
40  Ibid, 15.
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than eliminated or ignored, e.g. by documenting them in land use
plans that identify cattle tracks, seasonal grazing areas, and
watering sources .... To prevent [local elites using this process for
their own benefit] …, structures are needed to make decisions
about such rights in a way that is understood locally and
represented the interests of all rights holders.41
This all-encompassing initiative would theoretically help ensure
that democratic governance is instituted. It also would enable Free,
Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of the land users before the leasing
or alienation of land. The many years of agitation and advocacy has
increasingly made this a key criterion for many development agencies,
including the World Bank Group, as a way to minimize conflicts over
large-scale investments.42
Land activists and those critical of large-scale land investments
have also taken up this legal technique, which is basically a contract
between the investor (or new land holder) and existing land users.43
Since the 1990s, FPIC has been used to provide extensive information
on the project, potential risks, benefits and alternatives to the proposed
intervention to all stakeholders and to seek the approval of those most
affected.44 It has become a means of trying to ensure that local
landholders and land users provide their consent free of any coercion
and based on the provision of full information; although some
acknowledge it is difficult to do so as most such local groups often are
socially divided entities.45 It is this point, I suggest, that needs to be
explored further if something like community rights will be actualized
in new governance arrangements over land.
Such difficulties are apparent in the above quotation from Deininger,
which comes across as slightly fantastical, divorced from the politics
and the social relations shaping governance and authority throughout
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rural Africa. In the passage cited above, rural African communities
appear as if they could easily be transformed to become well-functioning
bureaucratic entities, which obey radically democratic decision-making
procedures.
In the remainder of the article, I will problematize the assumption
that smallholder farmers form an undifferentiated community based
on co-residence and would welcome such thoroughly democratized
administrative and representative structures as Deininger presents.
Instead of assuming that the current range of overlapping authorities
over the people in these land areas would even be keen to initiate
such a transformative programme and to support it, I propose that it is
more productive to understand how governance occurs on the ground
and to examine what possibilities exist, if any, for promoting something
like community rights in the context of land transfers. The cultural
politics of belonging is a key dimension of authority and decision-
making mechanism over land in Africa, which needs to be taken
seriously in light of efforts to promote some sort of community rights.
4.  THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF BELONGING
While there is increasing recognition in international policy instruments
and scholarship, as well as advocacy to have some form of community
representation in regards to decisions made concerning land deals,
what that means and how to achieve it are not straightforward. This
section examines the tricky issue of conceptualizing community in
regards to land and how this can make it difficult to ensure its realization
given the typical varied interests and claims to a territory, which may
overlap with others, in any type of FPIC initiative.
Most authors acknowledge that rural communities in Africa are
not homogenous but have a range of social differentiation along many
social axes such as gender, class, ethnicity, kinship, etc. Nonetheless,
some authors hold out for the possibility of constructing democratic
governance mechanisms, which could effectively represent these
differentiated communities.46 Others suggest that it is unlikely to ever
have any defined community give up its access to a valuable resource
like land, thereby questioning “the assumption that identified
46 See Cotula (n 7).
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infringements on customary rights and rural livelihoods will disappear
through additional legal and governance reforms.”47
Rather than necessarily assuming either avenue is correct (that a
more democratic governance mechanism can be constructed or that
further governance reforms will not convince rural land users to give
up their land), I suggest that one needs to examine the configuration
of power and authority relations, that is, what Bonnie Campbell has
termed modes of governance.48 Recalling at the same time how
governance dynamics shape people’s access to land as a focal lens on
possible ways to ensuring that more broad-based community rights
may be established and enforced in land deals. Modes of governance
over land brings together different authorities of varying scales of action
(e.g., national, district, local) and helps to constitute different subjects
with differential claims and rights towards various natural resources
(such as land, minerals, water, trees, and so on). In other words, the
meaning of community itself in relation to rural Africa is intimately
connected to the forms of governance over land.
The national state is a crucial player, as its laws and policies inform
who should have access to certain categories of land and its transfer. In
regards to territories designated for customary tenure, its rules often
define who can gain access to land and who are the main land-giving
authorities (such as chiefs, clan leaders, district governments, and so
on). These help to define the outlines of the community, but they are
typically fleshed out in more detail by the actual land-giving authorities.
These land-giving authorities are both the state-sanctioned ones and
those who may have complementary or competing authority, based on
other legislation or other moral orderings constituting twilight
institutions operating in the shadow of the state.49
It is at the level of the actual land-giving authorities that one sees
the interconnections between community formation and land. These
land-giving authorities decide who gains access to land and how it is
transferred. The criteria for getting land usually helps to define how
one belongs or not to some sense of community with particular rights
for accessing one’s own land and for accessing common property. Such
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criteria are often along the lines of lineage, generation, clan or ethnicity
and are gendered (almost always favouring men as the main
landholders). These criteria create “insiders” and “outsiders” as “rights
to land are closely connected to belonging to certain communities;
however, belonging is contested, negotiated, and made”.50
One fault-line for the contestation and negotiation of belonging
comes from the land rights given to those whose claims are disputable.
For example, different land-giving authorities may allow those who
are deemed to be strangers from the normative contours of the
community to gain access to land either as primary landholders or
secondary land users in some sort of leaseholder arrangement; as
discussed below on the tutorat institution in Côte d’Ivoire. Others may
even purchase land on a small scale, even if there is not a formal land
market, through what Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006)51 term
“vernacular land markets”. The latter refers to the fact that in legal
prohibitions against the sale and purchase of land in places like
Zimbabwe’s Communal Lands, there exists a form of informal
purchasing and selling of pieces of land. In the case of Zimbabwe, this
practice has increased in the Communal Lands.
There may be various forms of incorporation for these individuals
or their children to be considered as belonging to a community in
whose territory they live (such as marriage, participating in community
activities, recognizing ritual activities and prohibitions concerning the
land, etc.). It is at the same time common for such people and their
descendants to be considered strangers, even after several generations.
During times of crises, the differential axes of rights and access to
land can become fault-lines for conflict. In the last few decades, we
have seen these competing claims or divisions flaring up into serious,
if not violent disputes, often amplified by changing economic conditions
and political circumstances, with these land disputes contributing to
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both. Examples include Côte d’Ivoire,52 eastern Democratic Republic
of Congo,53 and Sudan.54 In each of these countries, there are instances
of overlapping claims to the same land by different individuals and
groups, asserting that they represent particular communities who have
a right to the land. In other instances, there can be generational and
gender differences in terms of decisions made to lease out land.
For example, as explained by Jean-Pierre Chauveau,55 in Côte
d’Ivoire (and elsewhere in West Africa), one can find an institution of
tutorat, which is an arrangement in which migrants are able to secure
access to land in areas of which they are strangers. The resident families
who give land on loan or sale to the migrant uses this institution to
ensure that the recipient is indebted to the land giver. This debt takes
various forms but usually a symbolic payment upon receipt of the land
or an annual share of the crops or an expectation of financial support
during times of crises. This hierarchical relationship continues through
the generations between land lenders/sellers and land recipients. This
institution was particularly popular from the 1950s to1970s when the
colonial and postcolonial governments encouraged migration of farmers
or labourers to the cocoa-growing regions. Notably, when the national
economy began to have great difficulties in the 1980s, there became
growing pressure to renegotiate these arrangements, particularly by
sons of the land-giving families who had migrated to urban areas. As
their economic prospects dimmed in the cities, they were worried about
the ability to access land in their home areas because, they argued,
much of it had already been allocated to “foreigners” over the decades.
This sentiment was reinforced and in turn intensified wider political
movements over who properly belonged to the nation, leading ultimately
to violent conflict.
These dynamics are important to recognize, for it means that foreign
investors are entering typically into already contested fields. It is
important to recognize that even though African governments may
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have the legal right to lease out land, which is being used by
communities, many who live on and use the land dispute that legal
right. Even if government officials or investors seek to meet community
representatives, it is not always a straightforward operation to
determine which community is being represented.
Nonetheless, this intensive interest by foreign and national
investors in acquiring land in Africa and the backlash, criticisms and
resistance it has generated means there are opportunities to develop
policies which seek to improve community rights. To do so, would
mean that one should seek to establish mechanisms that determine
the various rights and claims to lands and to craft ways to mediate disputes
between different claimants. Such efforts have been undertaken in different
jurisdictions and it is a difficult and often long-term process. Notably,
there could be mechanisms set up to determine land rights in areas of
land which the government wishes to lease out to investors.
The key step is to determine the rights and claims to land. It would
be imperative to involve a multi-stakeholder mechanism to do this
work. Colonial and post-colonial history in Africa is rife with the
marginalization or exclusion of different communities, women, and
others through exercises which privileged the voices of a few in
determining who has land rights and who does not. On the one hand,
evidence shows that women have had less access to land ownership
than men throughout Africa since at least the colonial period, though
the reality of this claim varies considerably across countries.56 On the
other hand evidence abounds of people being excluded on the basis of
ethnicity or other types of social distinctions such as the difficulty many
former farm workers had in receiving land in the Fast-Track Land
Resettlement exercise in Zimbabwe. These men and women had lost
their jobs due to the massive and often chaotic land resettlement
process in Zimbabwe in which the government redistributed white-
owned commercial farms to black Zimbabweans.
Largely on the assumption that they were foreigners, following
colonial labour migration patterns, many former farm workers were
discriminated against in the land redistribution exercise.57 This tendency
56 Cheryl Doss et al, “Gender inequalities in ownership and control of land in
Africa: Myth and reality” (2015) 46, Agricultural Economics, 403-434.
57 Evert Waeterloos and Blair Rutherford, “Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Challenges
and Opportunities for Poverty Reduction Among Commercial Farm Workers”
(2004) 32, World Development, 537-553.
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was challenged when the land rights determination process could not
have only government officials on it but also members of the civil
society organizations who work on rural development issues,
representatives of different communities who use the land (by ethnic
groups, generation, lineages or clans, and gender), and researchers
from the country who work on land issues. I am unaware of any such
empirical examples but I would think that without such a wide
representation, then there is a good chance that certain land rights or
claims would be ignored.
This mechanism could also determine whether or not there is land
for lease and, if so, who would be compensated and by how much.
This would be a difficult and contentious process and it may result in
a decision that there is no land to lease out. Observably, for investors
who want the greatest legitimacy within the wider communities and
to ensure that their payments go to those who are losing access to
land, this type of process is necessary, even if it may prove to be a long
and arduous one.
One could also develop a research tool to guide research by
independent, national researchers which look minimally at the various
land uses, primary and secondary rights to land-based resources, and
the various forms of governance and communities associated with, if
not constituted through, them. Such a tool would be adapted to each
situation. Its results would have to go through some sort of verification
process among the various land users and authorities and presented in
a way that land users can understand and posted in a transparent
fashion for others to interrogate. Once verified and viewed as legitimate,
the results can be used to determine those in the community or
communities who need to be consulted and provide their FPIC for any
transfer of land away from them and the type of compensation required.
Such processes may engender new notions of community regarding
access to the land and they may also lead to further disgruntlement as
these communities are fraught with different histories and politics.
Furthermore, these processes are not guaranteed to work, given the
contentious nature concerning access to most lands in rural Africa along
with tendency towards great suspicions between various rural-based
populations and the state. Nevertheless, only by seeking to be inclusive
and attendant to local understandings of who has different rights to
land can there be a chance of having some sort of community rights
recognized during the land transfer process.
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5.  CONCLUSION
Among some policy makers, activists and scholars, there is a growing
demand for some sort of recognition of community rights as a way of
ensuring that the rapid increase of land investment in Africa does not
lead to displacement and further erode equitable growth opportunities.
One policy tool that has been introduced is to secure the Free, Prior
and Informed Consent (FPIC) of the land users before the leasing or
alienation of any land.
Such recognition of community rights needs to be applauded and
built upon, but the devil is in the details. This article has identified
how land held in some sort of customary arrangements, which is the
type of legal setting for the majority of African land users, entails a
whole set of different problems. In particular, a significant problem
recognized in this article is the identification of the community itself,
as there is often nested land rights to most of such land and land-
based resources, constituted in part through different overlapping or
contested forms of governance mechanisms. Back to the CAMPFIRE
example at the start, while the local government had legal rights to
administer and determine who had land access in the communal lands,
in practice the traditional authorities were the land-giving authorities
and they could give land out to people who were deemed to be
foreigners and thus legally proscribed from having land in these areas.
Accordingly, identifying the particular community to ascertain the FPIC
leads directly to the thorny question of who holds land rights and who
decides who holds which rights from the state to the district and then
local level itself.
These issues may be daunting for outsiders, let alone for many
who inhabit such social webs. Where those promoting or governing
land transfers want to try to minimize conflict and ensure a broader
based support for these land investment deals, then they need to spend
the energy and time in developing processes that can thoroughly identify
and work with the various land users and land holders. Such efforts of
engaging the people who live in the territory of interest could also
ensure that many of them benefit from any eventual external investment
in the land which occurs, in terms of employment, training, providing
downstream inputs and services, and so forth. That is, by taking the
task of identifying and consulting the communities as seriously as
possible, the investors could become more anchored into the territory
and there could then be a greater likelihood of multiplier effects. This
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would be different from being a socially thin enclave, generally separated
from the economies of the people who live around them, which has
become the norm for most large-scale external land-based investments
in Africa (for example, mining, oil, agriculture, etc).58 Nonetheless, as
shown by programmes involving investment into communally-held
land, which are generally considered models of sustainable development
and socially responsible such as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, there are no
guarantees that those laudable goals will be achieved. Indeed they can
end up amplifying disputes about who are the actual land-giving
authorities and who defines members of a territory.
Given the increased activist and media attention towards land grabs
in Africa, aims to lease large amounts of land for various foreign-driven
motives try to ensure some sort of legitimacy among many of the
affected communities. If those involved in these land transactions do
not recognize some of the existing, on-the-ground dynamics of authority
and power – that is, the forms of governance – and their connection to
the actual formation of the communities which use the land, then there
is a likelihood of limited success in ensuring FPIC, let alone wider
development consequences among those who live adjacent to these
areas of investment. Rather, social science evidence suggests that one
needs to invest in understanding these dynamics of governance and
belonging as a way to ascertain whether one can move forward with,
and not against, the particular communities involved in the territory
identified.
58 James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Duke
University Press 2006), p. 38.
